Abstract. Recently, after analyzing Jiang et al. and He et al.'s remote user authentication scheme, Kumari et al. detected some defects in their own protocol and designed a user anonymous password authentication scheme without smart card. They claimed that their protocol is rigorous to resist a wide range of network attacks. Unfortunately, based on the analysis of a large amount of experiments, we found that their protocol is not robust enough when facing with changing session key attack. The user and server cannot achieve the consistency of the session even though they have been authenticated each other.
Introduction
With the continuous development of Internet technology, a growing number of people are keen on accessing resources through data communication and networks by the personal computers and mobile terminals like mobile phones, laptops, tablet computers, POS equipments, etc. Nevertheless, users need to communicate with providing servers in the opening conditions of network transferring. Because the messages are conveyed on the public channel, everyone can eavesdrop, intercept and modify the information on the channel. It is vital for us to design a more secure remote user authentication scheme to resist various kinds of attacks.
Lamport [1] first designed a remote password authentication scheme in 1981. Nevertheless, because of the static login ID, this may lead to the compromise of the partial information in the login message. Furthermore, the scheme is vulnerable to reply attack. Then many researchers has proposed a series of password authentication schemes in the following years [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . In 2009, Rhee et al. [12] proposed an authentication scheme without using smart card. They claimed that their scheme can resist off-line dictionary attack and impersonation attack. Unfortunately, Chen et al. [13] 
Review of Kumari et al.'s Scheme
In this section, a brief description of Kumari et al.'s scheme that contains three parts: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. The notations used throughout this paper are defined in 
Registration Phase
The steps of registration phase are as follows:
Step 1: The user i U first selects his identity i ID , password i PW , and a random number
to S through a secure channel.
Step 2: After receiving the message )} , ( , {
to i U via a secure channel.
Step 
Login Phase
i U first recovers the information from his USB stick and computes the following values:
Step 1:
and verifies whether * i W and i W is equal or not. If yes, the identity of i U is verified; otherwise, the session is discarded.
Step
and selects a arbitrary number
Step 3: i U submits the login request message } , , , {
to the server S .
Authentication Phase
Step Step 2: S calculates
If they are equal, the identity of i U is verified by S . Otherwise, S aborts the session.
Step 3: After choosing a arbitrary number 
Generates nonce a ，timestamp i T ,
Generates s T and checks ( ) ?
Checks the validity of i ID and
Generates random number b , 
Security Analysis
In this section, we assume that a vicious adversary has ability to monitor and intercept the message submitted on the channel. In this situation, Kumari et al.'s protocol cannot resist changing session key attack and provide untraceability.
Changing Session Key Attack
Step 4: Because of 
Conclusion
In this paper, we first review Kumari et al.'s password authentication scheme without smart cards. In addition, we analyze the security of Kumari et al.'s protocol and show that their protocol cannot withstand changing session key attack and ensure untraceability.
